

## HAP deployment to Haiti – final report

March to September 2010



By the HAP team in Haiti:  
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## Executive summary

As a result of the 12th January 2010 earthquake 2.3 million people were displaced resulting in over 1300 camps, with 1.6 million residents. The camps vary in terms of size (from a few tents to up to 50,000 people); how they were formed (while some were planned the majority formed spontaneously after the earthquake); and level of support and management from NGOs and agencies.

For the humanitarian response, a focus on, and sufficient level of, accountability is necessary to meet people's needs, and reduces the possibility of errors, abuse and corruption. Such a focus results in more effective and better quality programmes, and enables organisations themselves to perform better. For the purpose of improving accountability at the operational level and to highlight it on the humanitarian agenda in Haiti, a HAP deployment was conducted from March to September. This deployment was established as a part of an overall quality and accountability presence that incorporated the expertise of both HAP and The Sphere Project, and was hosted by the joint initiative of RedR UK and Bioforce, DRSS. The team worked to seek improvement in how the international community shared information and involved the disaster-affected communities in the response, and supported the establishment of well-functioning complaint mechanisms to hold agencies and individuals accountable for their actions. Achievements of the six-month deployment included the design and implementation of impact-oriented training for national and international agencies, the development of a widely applicable tool to assess the role of camp committees, initiation of a joint complaints mechanism, and establishment of a forum to exchange knowledge and joint initiatives. The team worked closely with HAP members, non-affiliated agencies, the UN, national NGOs and national and international media. Though this phase of HAP presence in-country has ended, the material developed and analyses conducted are continuing to influencing the humanitarian response in both Haiti and beyond.


## I. Acknowledgements

The activities in Haiti were supported financially throughout the deployment by the ACT Alliance/DanChurchAid (partially through a grant from Danida), and in the earlier stages by ECHO and the latter stage by Tearfund, and World Vision. The HAP team in Haiti was hosted by the joint RedR and Bioforce Disaster Response Support Services (DRSS) project.

## II. Introduction

The Haiti earthquake on 12<sup>th</sup> January 2010 caused the displacement of 2.3 million people, of which 1.6 million people ended up in over 1300 camps. Almost immediately the ACT Alliance (driven by DanChurchAid) called for a response under HAP's New Emergency Policy, and supported an initial deployment of a HAP and Sphere Quality and Accountability (Q&A) Support Team to Haiti for three weeks in February. More details of their activities, learning from this initial mission can be found in their [Summary Report](#).

Following their assessment, a 6 month deployment was planned from March to September 2010. The diagram below summarises key staff involved in each of the deployments:



The HAP component of the deployment was managed throughout by Barb Wigley, Programmes Coordinator at HAP, and the team was hosted in Port-au-Prince by RedR/Bioforce as part of the joint Disaster Response Support Services (DRSS) project, which provided the opportunity to work with other agencies focused on training and in particular with the Sphere resource people.

The [Terms of Reference](#) for the longer deployment was refined once the team arrive in country following meetings with agencies to define key priorities for the team, and a detailed activity plan was developed following a consultation meeting with HAP Members. The following focus areas were recommended by the group attending the planning meeting:

- Trainings
- Assessments and implementation of recommendations
- Field support /Coaching
- Forum for experience sharing and learning on Accountability
- Working with UN and other NGOs to promote accountability and PSEA
- Civil Society engagement
- Evidence-based advocacy

### III. Key activities and achievements:

The following section highlights key achievements and activities that were conducted in order to meet the three main objectives of the deployment, as outlined in the ToR:

**Objective 1: To identify and deliver appropriate support and learning activities with interested agencies** in order to strengthen their understanding of, and ability to apply, established quality and accountability tools.

**Objective 2: To collaborate** with relevant stakeholders **and advocate** for quality and accountability of the wider humanitarian response, including through raising awareness of existing approaches to Q&A and highlighting strengths and gaps observed to date.

**Objective 3: To document and share good practice and learning** in order to build on the pool of resources available for senior managers and practitioners in Haiti and globally, and for use as part of wider discussions on the 'state of' quality and accountability as part of current humanitarian response.

The HAP 2007 Standard was used as the basis for the work in Haiti, with heightened emphasis placed upon the benchmarks addressing:

- a) Information dissemination
- b) Participation
- c) Complaints handling

#### **Workshops, training, coaching and other tailored support for agencies**


There was a high demand for training, and the team responded with a range of open and agency-specific workshops. Examples of the types of workshops provided include:

Introduction to accountability for practitioners and management (agency-specific and open)	1 day	Conducted, for example, for Oxfam GB, World Vision, GOAL
Introduction to accountability and rapid self-assessment of practice at project level with site visit to identify existing strengths and gaps.	1.5 – 3 days	Variations of this were conducted for: Norwegian Church Aid, ACTED, Lutheran World Federation, Tearfund, Save the Children, Medair, Concern, and ICCO partners.
Benchmark specific training, such as developing an approach to information sharing with senior managers and staff; participation	1 day	Conducted, for example, for Lutheran World Federation and ACT Alliance members
Developing and integrating HAP and Sphere indicators into human rights monitoring	2 days	Conducted with nine national monitoring agencies, including RNDDH.

Over the six months, 20 training sessions were held for over 350 participants (324 individuals) from 11 HAP members and 58 non-members (including national and international NGOs and UN agencies). The graph below summarizes the proportion of participants who came from each type of organization. Overall the majority of participants were national staff.

While the majority of trainings were held in Port-au-Prince, sessions were also held in Leogane and Jacmel.

*Graph 1: Source of participants – percentage of workshop participants from different organizations*



In addition to training, support was offered to agencies in the form of:

- Quick camp/project assessments (for example these were conducted for World Vision, Lutheran World Federation and GOAL) – to support agencies to better understand current practice, and develop action needed as a result of this.
- Specific review of camp committee structures (for example with ACTED) – from which the camp committee assessment tool was developed, see below.
- Consultation and advice to agency staff on, for example, accountability training materials and workplans (for example with Tearfund, Merlin, Norwegian Church Aid).
- Training material developed by the HAP team was shared on request. In addition, certain tools were shared widely, for example a training resource for exploring the links between stronger accountability and reducing the risk of corruption and sexual abuse and exploitation was emailed to all contacts and added to the HAP website ([New training resource - accountability and corruption](#)). The feedback from this was very positive.

As part of workshops and other activities over 2,000 copies of the HAP Standard were distributed in English, French and Creole.

### **Box 1: HAP training – example of impact on the ground**

The following analysis is based on a selection of seven agencies that all expressed commitment to implement the action plans based on the training. The analysis is based on email and telephone conversations and does not entail a verification of the information received. All seven agencies took part in training during the first three months of the HAP deployment to allow time for the implementation process<sup>1</sup>. The selected agencies cover the regions of Port-au-Prince, Leogane and Jacmel. Six out of the seven agencies were part of agency targeted training, one training was focused on the agency and their three national partners, one was only for that concerned agency and four were part of a multi-agency, but still targeted, training. Only one agency took part in the open trainings, which meant no engagement with management, no selection of participants, no follow up actions agreed etc. For five of the seven agencies, a self-assessment in camps was included as part of the training.

Five of the seven agencies reported being in the process of implementing the action plans. The actions revolved mainly around the HAP benchmark on information sharing and on participation and included: community meetings, door-to-door interviews, focus groups, notice boards, poster, banners, and fliers. One agency was trialling a complaints and response mechanism and had developed - and shared with HAP - material to further assess accountability and to educate their colleagues. Another agency had decided after the training to have a permanent presence in the camps where they operated and one mentioned how the training had led them to be more aware of the role of the camp committees and how to improve the collaboration. Three agencies had scaled up the HAP training internally by using HAP material that had been shared by HAP with assistance in planning implementation. One agency reported back on an action plan that was only partly focused on improving the accountability of their operations. The part focused on accountability was, though not ambitious, sound, but the main elements of the action plan were based on programmatic improvements. This indicated confusion between programmatic improvements such as increasing the volume of distribution and the accountability aspects of the distribution.

In two of the agencies, the action plans had not been discussed at management level and were not in the process of being implemented. Both agencies explained the lack of progress as high turn-over of staff and waiting to fill positions related to accountability. One agency explained that internal issues had contributed to confusion about roles of responsibilities. In discussing the situation with each agency, both agencies expressed satisfaction with the HAP training and were both of the opinion that the training had led to awareness and reflections on accountability that potentially can lead to results in the longer run.

Given the emergency context in Haiti it is encouraging that five out of seven agencies implemented the action plans. Though one agency seemed to lack a distinction between actions to improve programmatic output and to improve the accountability level, the reported actions implemented from the five agencies seemed sound and ambitious, especially when taking into consideration that they were based on either a one day or on a one and a half day training. When talking to the agencies, it appeared important that the training was targeted to their agency and their gaps and challenges - based on the self-assessment in the camps - and that their management was informed and involved and, finally, that in-depth discussions were held with focal persons prior, during and after regarding both training content and which staff members to select. One of the two agencies failing to implement the actions took part in an open training without such input. This could indicate, as expected prior to the analysis, that the approach of collaboration based on management buy-in, focal person involvement, joint selection of participants and conducting self-assessments to base the action plans on real gaps and challenges, yields better results.

When analyzing the feedback, it is interesting that an agency that succeeded and one that failed to implement the action plans both had change of focal points and people to drive it forward but with two very different results. And in both agencies there was senior management level buy-in, but again with very different results. As such, more agency analyses are needed to reach conclusions as to causalities.

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<sup>1</sup> It could be interesting to do a second round of follow up with agencies that participated in the training in the last three months, as the training and collaboration with agencies had the advantage of being based on lessons learned from the first three months.

Finally, interest for scaling up the training was expressed. It was an ongoing and strategic decision regarding how many agencies to work with and how much time could be invested in follow up actions. It could prove worthwhile to ensure a very basic “training of trainers” component to the work plan. This could entail identifying a person in each agency to scale up the training. A training package could then be prepared; during the training, special attention could be given to this person and 1-2 hours right after the training could be used with the selected person to answer questions and brainstorm on training structures for that agency.

*Key additional points of learning on workshops, training, coaching and other tailored support for agencies*

- In the context of Haiti, open introductory workshops on accountability were a good way to raise awareness of accountability as an issue, the presence of the HAP team in country, and the types of support that can be provided.
- Targeted trainings to specific organisations, or small groups of organisations, appeared to yield more outcomes in terms of change in practice. It was sometimes difficult, particularly in the beginning, to ensure the participation of key staff who could push the accountability agenda forward, even if this had been agreed before the workshop. Working with agencies to develop a plan for improvement, of which a workshop may be one step, clarifying HAP team and the agency responsibilities as part of this, provides a useful basis against which progress can be reviewed.
- The rapid-assessments as part of training programmes were particularly successful in helping participants to identify existing gaps between their understanding of current practice and the realities on the ground from the perspective of beneficiaries. Sufficient time should be allocated in advance of the field visit to build participant understanding on accountability. In addition, support needs to be given in the development of action plans that build on the findings.
- High staff turn-over, in particular of staff in more senior positions (typically international staff), hindered the extent to which improved practice was driven forward over a sustained period.
- Of note in Haiti was the number of positions created over the course of the year with specific responsibility for accountability, in particular amongst HAP members. Of the 13 HAP members in Haiti, 7 had or have positions with accountability in the title<sup>2</sup>, with a further 4 having staff with a strong focus on accountability as part of their role. This enabled the HAP team to concentrate on providing support to those staff as requested. One of the disadvantages of this approach was the reduced level of contact between the HAP team and agency senior managers, which can help build buy-in for actively promoting stronger accountability and supporting action plans.
- There was interest in building the capacity of staff to scale up accountability training within agencies, and there were several examples of staff replicating HAP training for others. To support with this, it is important to have training packages that can be easily and widely shared, and in the future, the appropriateness of holding a Training of Trainers should be considered.

***Development and testing of a Camp Committee Assessment Tool to strengthen community participation***

During the early stages of the deployment, the HAP team identified that camp committees, and the level of responsibility given to them by the humanitarian community, played a key role in agency accountability. While agencies commonly work through these committee(s), there were gaps in awareness around how the committee(s) were created, their role, and the extent to which the population regarded them as able to represent their views.

Together with ACTED, the HAP team developed a camp committee assessment tool, which was used in Ti Savanne camp, a camp managed by ACTED. The results proved useful for ACTED in their management of the camp and resulted in increased participation from groups such as woman and people living with disabilities.

Following interest created by an article on this project that was published on the HAP website, HAP was invited to work with the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) to further test and refine the tool

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<sup>2</sup> Although it should be noted that not all these positions existed from the beginning of the response, and not all had a post holder at the same time.

based on joint field visits to three camps. The tool and results were widely shared through presentations in Cluster meetings, and articles published. This work helped to spark a camp committee technical working group, to feed into the Camp Coordination Camp Management (CCCM) cluster. In addition, two training modules were developed (on accountability and role of camp committees) for IOM to use as part of existing training held regularly for camp managers. IOM will make the assessment of camp committees, using this tool, a condition of future funding allocation in Haiti, and it is anticipated that the tool will be used by IOM globally.

*Related articles:*

- [Camp Committees in Haiti: Un-Accountability Mechanisms?](#) (May 2010) – summarises the role of camp committees and the findings based on the work with ACTED.
- [Power to the committee? A tool for agencies working with camp committees in Haiti](#) (October 2010) – summarises and launches the tool
- [The role of humanitarian organizations when working with camp committees: Findings of assessments from three camps in Haiti](#) (November 2010)

*Key points of learning from developing and testing this camp tool:*

- The identification of a key issue within the Haiti context, and the development of a tool to help address this, enabled the team to positively respond to needs expressed by a number of agencies, and focus efforts on a key accountability challenge and advocacy issue. As such, it helped the HAP team to offer a significant aid to agencies within the Haitian context, was a good way of engaging with different groups, and provided topical material that was picked up by different media groups.
- The scaling-up of the work undertaken with ACTED (including sharing learning widely) by working with IOM to refine the tool, helped to raise awareness on the importance of addressing the issue of camp committees, the existence of the tool, and the role of the HAP team in Haiti (in particular at UN level). This approach of 'scaling-up', from single agency to cluster level, could be replicated in other locations, in response to other context specific accountability challenges, and as part of general advocacy on stronger accountability.
- The amount of time needed to develop a tool (to the point of being ready for publishing), plus to work with clusters, should not be underestimated. The period from start to finish was longer than anticipated (May to September), and much time was invested in finalising the tool. While more concentrated efforts on the tool would have resulted in it being finalised sooner, this would also have been at the expense of other activities. Different contexts will demand a different approach, and the pros and cons of aiming to develop a finalised tool within a deployment should be carefully considered.

### ***Developing a camp-level Joint Complaints and Response Mechanism (JCRM)***

Between July-August the HAP team worked with Lutheran World Federation, Save the Children and World Vision to develop a Joint Complaints and Response Mechanism (JCRM) to be piloted in a camp where all three agencies were working. Over the course of two months, the agencies worked together to develop key tools, seek input from the camp committee and residents, and reach the point where the joint mechanism could be implemented. The HAP team facilitated a series of meetings between the agencies, provided technical expertise, offered feedback on tools, and supported with drafting the complaints handling procedures.

Unfortunately, days before the JCRM was to be launched in early September, the land owners of the camp site issued an unexpected eviction notice, giving residents one month to leave the site. While the roll out of the JCRM was then suspended in the chosen camp, the process, tools developed and learning to date from this was summarised and shared widely to inspire and support other agencies in setting up such a mechanism. The three agencies involved in the development of this JCRM have expressed commitment to applying the process in other camps, with at least two of them planning to set up joint CRMs with other agencies.

*Related article:*

- [Collaboration and innovation - developing a joint complaint and response mechanism in Haiti](#) (October 2010) – includes a summary of steps taken with the three agencies and tools developed in setting up the JCRM

Key points of learning in working with agencies to develop a JCRM:

- Working with agencies to drive forward improved practice from start to finish, enabled the HAP team to identify learning related to the process of developing and rolling out a JCRM that could then be shared widely with others.
- The addition support from the HAP team kept the momentum for piloting the Joint CRM, and provided the extra capacity needed to document the process.
- There has been much positive feedback from agencies within Haiti and beyond regarding the tools developed as a result of this work. Sharing tools widely is a good way of generating interest in accountability, and supporting managers to understand how they can practically strengthen practice.

### **Setting-up an Accountability Learning Working Group (ALWG)**

The HAP team, in collaboration with the SPHERE team<sup>3</sup> and other interested agencies, established an Accountability Learning Working Group (ALWG) to provide a forum for international and national agencies to share examples of good practice, tools and learning on accountability. From May to September, the ALWG met eight times to jointly develop the Terms of Reference for the group and to have discussions on:

- i. Conducting a camp committee assessment to strengthen community participation (presentation by ACTED).
- ii. Setting up a complaint and response mechanism for beneficiary complaints (presentation by Concern).
- iii. Developing a committee of grass roots organisations to ensure stronger accountability (presentation by Oxfam GB).
- iv. Port-au-Prince vs other areas – the different accountability issues, challenges and approaches needed in urban vs rural areas (presentation by Tearfund)
- v. The Sphere Standards (presentation by Sphere)
- vi. Accountability as part of hurricane preparedness – what can we put in place now to ensure stronger accountability as part of emergency response (discussion lead by HAP and Sphere).

Participation in the group was open, and as such each meeting was attended by different staff and agencies. Meetings were announced via a circulation list and the NGO Coordination Support Office (NCSO), resulting in increasing attendance by agencies operational in Haiti (including a number of National NGOs).

The initial success of the ALWG in Port-au-Prince has sparked interest among participating agencies in launching a similar group in Leogane. Following the departure of the HAP and Sphere staff, several accountability staff working with HAP members in Haiti have discussed ways to continue meeting, and have arranged future ALWG meetings.

### **Learning on setting up an ALWG:**

- Having a group with an open invitation engages a wide range of staff and agencies, and circulation of invitations by the NCSO enabled the HAP team to reach out to new agencies who we may not have otherwise met (both national and international agencies).
- Differing levels of staff and agency participation in each meeting limited the group to sharing of experience and practice, rather than being able to identify clear messages that could be used by all for advocacy, or develop common tools. In the context of Haiti, it is difficult to envisage how HAP could have established a closed group, but as a result, the level of viable impact of the group may have been less. Other contexts, with limited number of NGOs, would allow for greater continuation of themes and work between meetings.
- Participants valued the opportunity to share experiences, and practice, however simple. For many this was the main opportunity to be able to discuss accountability with others.

<sup>3</sup> The SPHERE team involvement in the setting up of the ALWG was limited due to the lack of SPHERE representative in Haiti. The HAP team worked on the first draft of the ToR with the SPHERE consultant.

- 1.5 hours for each meeting is not long! The amount that can be shared and discussed in that time is limited, and so expectations of what can be achieved by the HAP team should reflect this. The meetings focused on agencies sharing their experience, and while HAP staff played a role in highlighting good practice, it was not always possible during the time to address all misconceptions and relevant points related to the topic. To avoid misinterpretation the purpose of the ALWG needs to be clearly communicated as a place for sharing experience rather than a HAP workshop, and the name should reflect the group purpose.
- Arranging meetings and sharing notes can be time consuming, and the impact of an ALWG is hard to measure. It is recommended that the forum is conducted and steered by the most active agencies as soon as possible.

### ***Participation in UN and NGO Steering Committee on Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (PSEA)***

The HAP team participated in activities to promote the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) in Haiti as part of the PSEA steering committee. Activities included: attending steering committee meetings (and calling meetings when the PSEA Coordinator was out of the country); sharing existing tools on CRMs; taking a lead in initiating and supporting the development of a camp-level joint CRM with three agencies (see above), and sharing learning from this widely; facilitating a session as part of the training for agency PSEA focal points; developing and sharing widely training resources for initiating discussions with staff on how their agency could reduce the risk of SEA; and providing technical support and input to a local initiative called the Witness Project, which aimed to develop an community approach for identifying and reporting incidences of SEA and referring these to agencies.

### ***Learning on playing a key role in PSEA as part of a HAP deployment***

- Participation by different agencies in the steering committee was erratic, and progress as a result of the meetings was frustratingly slow. The participation in the steering committee as a means to improve practice on PSEA was time consuming for the HAP team (meetings were in log-base and often longer than planned), and it is hard to identify a clear impact as a result of the time devoted.
- The steering committee suffered from a lack of resources. While a PSEA Coordinator had been recruited to lead this by OCHA, this position was challenged by limited funds and no additional staff support. Future HAP deployments should consider where greatest impact can be made on PSEA, given HAP's own limited resources.
- In order for HAP to focus on strengthening PSEA across a whole response – as opposed to at agency level – during an NEP deployment, more time is needed (either by reducing the scope of the deployment ToR and workplan, or by having an extra staff member who is focused on this). Ways of sharing skills, experience and knowledge on PSEA with the roving team need to be found, in particular those linked to building agency consensus and commitment to PSEA.
- PSEA in Haiti is a pertinent issue and should be given time, energy and resources

### ***Engaging with different stakeholders:***

#### ***a) The Haitian Government and civil society***

The importance of engaging with the local NGOs, civil society and the Haitian Government was recognized from the onset. In this spirit, the team organized several meetings and discussions with civil society organizations (Ushahid, Haiti Aid Watch Dog, Réseau National de Défense des Droits de l'Homme (RNDDH) and RORSS Solidarité) to explore ways of collaboration. Of note:

- A joint HAP-Sphere training was organized for nine national monitoring agencies, to identify how HAP and Sphere standard could be integrated into existing human rights monitoring being conducted by these agencies.
- A workshop was held in Creole for the national NGO network, RORRS. In addition, the HAP team conducted training for national partners of HAP members and other agencies.
- To support the team, and help build capacity that will remain in Haiti after the end of the HAP deployment, Réseau National de Droits Humaines (RNDDH) seconded a member of staff to HAP for seven weeks. RNDDH also joined HAP as a full member. It is hoped that this staff member will continue to deliver trainings on accountability, and will continue to raise awareness on the importance of accountability as part of their ongoing work.

Discussions were held in collaboration with Sphere with the Haitian Department of Civil Protection, regarding conducting a joint training for a number of their trainers. While much enthusiasm was voiced during this meeting, the DCP were not able to identify a suitable date for this training. Unfortunately there were no obvious other entry points for working with the government.

#### ***b) NGO coordination and cluster meetings to promote accountability***

The team attended selected meetings organized by the NGO Coordination and Support Office (NCSO) as well as selected cluster meetings. Working with NSCO helped the team to disseminate information on the ALWG to other agencies and to national NGOs in particular.

The cluster meetings were attended, particularly in the beginning, to create awareness that HAP was present in Haiti, build networks, and look for collaboration possibilities. Later in the deployment, the cluster meetings were used to disseminate information about findings and distributing material developed by HAP.

#### ***c) Donors***

Towards the end of the deployment, meetings were set up with key donors, to share learning on accountability and raise awareness of the work that HAP had been doing in Haiti.

#### ***Learning from engaging with different stakeholders***

- While the deployment ToR outlined the team should work with the government if possible, this was difficult to achieve in this context, where the government had been further weakened by the earthquake. It was difficult to establish contact, and identify who the team should engage with, given limited resources. For future deployments a discussion is needed about whether working with the government should be one of the main objectives (given the time constraints of the deployment), or whether this is something HAP members with long-term presence in the country should take a lead on.
- While it was sometimes difficult to identify key national NGOs to engage with, HAP is very committed to working with them as a priority. In Haiti this was achieved by reaching out to implementation agencies, some of whom were affiliated with HAP members. On reflection, while the training was deemed valuable, more time should have been allocated to the national NGOs, in particular with following up trainings and offering other types of support.
- Working with the UN in Haiti was time consuming, but was an important platform to create awareness of accountability challenges identified by the HAP team and to ensure that a bigger number of operational agencies were aware of the knowledge and/or tools generated through HAP.
- The model of working with agencies, including methods to scale-up impact and reach and taking concrete learning from specific contexts to share widely, was perceived by the team as a good use of HAP time.

#### ***Documenting and sharing learning, tools from the deployment***

A number of different activities were undertaken to document and share learning during the deployment:

- In May, the HAP team initiated a collaboration with documentarist and photographer, Robin Moore, to develop and capture footage on accountability issues in camps. It is anticipated the results from this work will be used to help promote accountability and serve as training material. Personal circumstances have caused an unavoidable delay in the handover of these materials.
- Articles on the work of the team, and accountability issues, were posted on the HAP website and subsequently published on AlertNet. In addition, the team spoke with journalists working for a Danish Newspaper (published in July 2010) and the Haitian Times, and meetings were held with the organizers of training for Haitian journalists.
- Tools and training materials were designed and disseminated, including:
  - Training materials - including a training scenario for exploring with staff the links between accountability and PSEA, and how risks of SEA could be reduced.
  - Joint Complaint and Response Mechanism process of developing and associated tools.
  - Camp Committee Assessment Tool

- In September HAP's research associate visited Haiti to undertake a series of discussions in camps with residents to understand their views on how accountable they felt agencies were. The findings from this will be shared widely as part of HAP's annual report.

*Additional learning based on the activities undertaken as part of the 6 month deployment*

- Working with Sphere resource staff – while close collaboration with Sphere was anticipated, this was difficult to achieve given gaps and turnover in Sphere resource people. A common understanding and agreement on what the collaboration should exactly look like had not been reached, and therefore understanding of the collaboration and its priority differed between staff. Advance thinking on concrete examples of the types of collaboration that could take place during an emergency response, plus developing resources for this, would help to speed up the process in the future.
- HAP's role vs agency's roles – The HAP team struggled at times with determining the extent of their role in ensuring action plans from trainings were implemented, and in determining the level of support that was reasonable to provide to agencies without absolving them of responsibility for providing that support. While the HAP team in an emergency may view themselves as a catalyst, with the agency responsible for driving the process forward, agency staff at country level often expect the HAP team to play a greater role in bringing about change, which ensured that demand for the team's services was consistently higher than they had the ability to meet.
- Selection of agencies – as the HAP membership, and interest in HAP support from other agencies, grows, reflection is needed on where energy should be directed, in particular in an emergency deployment. While it is tempting to work more with the more enthusiastic agencies, this also risks working with similar agencies in each location, and with those that have themselves greater resources to take the work forward independently. On the other hand, working with more 'reluctant', less enthusiastic agencies, also risks less visible impact. Similarly it remains a strategic choice for HAP to decide how much time to allocate on each agency. Intensive support is more likely to result in greater change and momentum among those agencies, but this will be at the expense of engaging with more agencies, or in doing less 'emergency-wide' work.
- Measuring and capturing impact – at agency-level there is need for greater reflection on what can be considered a good level of impact following HAP support. While this will depend on the level and nature of support given to develop a framework/methodology for reviewing, for example the subsequent impact of training, will better help review approaches and methodology of the training.
- Analysis of how to bring about greatest change given the context – an initial review of existing stakeholders in the given context is a useful starting point for identifying groups that can help bring about change in practice and stronger accountability. For example, in Haiti, the presence of a large number of national media groups and monitoring agencies presented an opportunity for engaging with these agencies to develop national demand for stronger accountability.

Hosting, funding and initiating the deployment

- Deployment initiated by HAP member – DanChurchAid played a leading role in initiating the deployment from early on and providing the financial support needed. This indicates members are starting to play more of a role in 'demanding' HAP support in emergencies. HAP learning and expertise from previous deployments should be continue to drawn upon to shape future deployments supported by members.
- Being hosted by a non-operational agency - the original concept of being hosted by the DRSS project to form a hub of quality and accountability, including Sphere and, in theory, the NGO coordination team, had considerable potential. However, the different focus of training and other activities (DRSS focused primarily on driver and guard/security training) limited opportunities for working together. High staff turnover within the DRSS team (with new staff not aware of why HAP and Sphere were based in the office), and sudden closure of the office in September, also posed challenges. By being based outside an operational NGO, the team missed opportunities to absorb general discussions on the humanitarian response as part of day to day work. The value of this should not be underestimated when choosing hosting locations in the future.

#### **IV. Reflections on the key accountability challenges in Haiti**

Based on the six-month HAP deployment in Haiti a number of accountability challenges from the response to the earthquake were identified. While there was an enormous response by the international community to the earthquake in Haiti, the impression from the first 8 months was that much still needs to be done to strengthen agency accountability to affected-people, particularly in the areas of information sharing, participation and complaint handling. While on the whole, agencies were aware of the need for stronger accountability and its importance, there seemed to be a number of blockages that prevented agencies from achieving this. While some agencies tried innovative approaches to improving accountability, these tended to be exceptions rather than common practice. The low number of concrete good practice examples identified by the team by the end of September 2010 highlights the need for greater focus on accountability as one of the key indicators of programme success, and greater emphasis from senior managers and headquarters in order to drive stronger accountable approaches forward from much earlier in an emergency response.

An article discussing the key accountability challenges in Haiti has been published on the HAP website as a part of the [November 2010 HAP Newsletter](#)